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Introduction
The law,like psychology, has
slowly developed to tecognize that
familes are coordinated, intetcon-
nected and interdependent organisms
in which each member plays anim-
portant tole. Trial lawyers have long
observed the devastating effects that
injury or death of one member has
on other members and the fam)ly as a
whole. In cases of catastrophic injury
or death of one member, devastation
to the others and rents in the fabric
of the family are inevitable. Histori-
cally, however, damage to family
members caused by severe injury, or
death of one was not cognizable in
tort except where direct economic
causation was provable.
Motcover, casualty insurance
policies were drafted with "Each
Person" and "Each Âccident" ancl
"Limits of LiabiÏty" clauses based
on the assumption that benefit limits
were defined by whether one or more
persons suffered direct physical
traùr.r, and injury in an accident,
Neither tort law not insurance law
made room for the possibiìity that a
wife would suffer emotional injury
from watching her husband's violent
death when a semi collided with his
fatm equipment;2 or a mother would
suffer when watching her chjld se-
vereþ injured in a crosswalk;3 or a
father would suffet caring for the
bowel and urinary functions of his
incapacitated chjld run over whìle
roller skating.a
Since the 1980s, ho'rvever, the
Montana Supreme Coutt has signifi-
cantly expanded the situations for
which tort law will compensate fam-
ily members of those suffering severe
injury or death. However, expanding
tort law does nothing to secure ad-
equate recovery for the farnlly unless
the newly recognized claims ate also
covered by casualty insurance. Conse-
quently, expanding the tort law has
provoked a line of appellate cases
examining issues of whether family
member injuries and damages are
covered by the auto casualty policies
and whether they trþger "Each Acci-
dent" limits of coverage as opposed
to "Each Pefson" limits of coverage,
which is typically much less than the
"Each r{ccident" coverage limits.
This article explores those situa-
tions in which Montana tott law now
recognizes secondary injuries to fam-
ily members resulting from primary
severe injuries or death of another
family member, which recognirion
may invoke additional auto insurance
coverage. The author will ftst make a
short survey of the development of
Montana tort law insofat as it has
come to take cognrzance of farnily
injuries and will then look at the
application of insurance law to those
claims with special emphasis on re-
cent cases, Time flies, and the author
notes that it has been sevefl years
since "Insurance coverage fot Dam-
ages for Emotional Distress in Mon-
tana" appeared in this publication in
Summer 2004.s That article provides
a more in-depth treatment of emo-
tional distress cases. A summary of
that article's history of tort develop-
ment is a good place to begin out
anaþsis.
SV'e will use the term "family
njury" to describe that class of in-
jury and damage a fanrtly member
suffers when another family member
is severely injured or kjlled. 'We can-
not call the family member class
"derivative" or "parasitic" claims,
because either term suggests that
family member claims are automati-
caþ not so distinct and independent
as to trigget 
^ 
sep^rate insutance
limit, which is actually our inquiry. In
fact, many of the claims have been
deemed derivative so as not to trigger
a second lirnit, but others have at-
tained the status of an independent
"bodily injury" to a family member
such that the "Each Accident" insur-
ance liability limit is triggered, invari-
ably doubling the limit of recovery.
Some of the cases that will be dis-
cussed do not involve family member
claims but develop emotional distress
claims that could be pressed by fam-
ily membets. !Øe will approach these
claims and damages as they apply to
famtly membets, because it is through
farniy members that the plaintiff's
lawyer secu:es adequate .compensa-
tion for the damages the family suf-
fers. The same claims in non-family
members might end up competing
for limited insurance lirnits. rJTe will
use "Each Petson/Each Accident"
and "Per Person/Per Âccident" to
be interchangeable.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF
FAMILY MEMBER CI-AIMS
IN MONTANA TORT I.AW
,\. Recognizing family membets'
sofrow, mental distress, and grief
in wrongful death cases
It w4s not until 1983 that, in
Dawson u. Hill dt Hi// Track Lines,6
Montana abandoned the "English
Rule" that one could not tecovet fot
emotional pain, even for the death of
family membets, because such a dam-
age had no pecuniary value. Montana
permitted tecovery for loss of society
and companionship only insofat as
one could demonstrate a pecuniary
vøJue. Mile u. Rocþ Moøntain Bell
TelEhone (1909)l and Hollingsworth u.
Dauis-Daþ Estøtu Copper (1909).8 In
Dawson u. Hill dv Llill Track Lines, the
Montana Supteme Court held that
l:
ri
,t
l
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damages for the sortow, mental dis-
tress, or grief of the parents of a
deceased minor are recoverable under
the wrongful death statute,i[lICA27-
1.-512 (1979), ovetruling Mile and
LIollingswortlt.
A brief review of the wrongful
death/survival action remedies avail-
able when a famlly membet is killed
is necessary here. By statute, Montana
recognizes two civil actions that can
arise from the death of an individual.
MCA S 27-1.-501, establishes what is
called by convention the "survival"
action, the civil action that existed in
favor of the decedent before his or
her death. By virtue of the statute,
the action survives the death as an
asset of the estate and can be pressed
by the decedent's personal representa-
tive. This sutvival action covers
claims that came into existence v¡hile
the decedent was still alle. Hern u.
Safeco Ins. Co. of lllinois, (2005).'If a
decedent survived personal injuries
for "an appreciable length of time"
before dying from those injuties, the
court recognizes a survival action as
it did in StEhens u. Brown (L972)10
where the decedent was struck by a
motorboat, knocked into the water,
and drowned. The coutt there held
the time it took ftom the impact until
death by drowning was an "appre-
ciable length of time." The corollary
is that there is no survival action if
the person died instantaneously.
Starkerubørg u. State (1997).11
rWhile the survival action belongs
to the estate of the deceased person,
MCA S 27 -1.-51.3 recognizes a sepa-
rate actjon for wrongful death, which
the court tn Fisher u. Missoala lVhite
Pine Sash Co. (1974),12 said creates an
independent right in desþated sut-
vivors for the damages they sustained
as a tesult of the decedent's death.
Hence, the wrongfr,rl death action
belongs to the heits. However, MCA
S 27-1-501(2) provides that survival
and wrongful death actions "must be
combined in one legal action and any
element of damages may be recov-
ered only once."13 Part of our inquiry
then is which family member dam-
âges can be addressed in which of
these two causes of action.
B, Recognizing family members'
emotional distress at other's severe
injury or death
At the same time it decided
Dawson, the Montana Supreme Court
issued Versland u. Caron Transþort
(1983)14 which followed the landmark
1968 California case of Dillon u.
ItgÅ," allowing a bystander recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional
distress regardless of whether the
bystander suffered any physical im-
pact or was even in the "zone of
daoger." The Montana court in
Versland required that it be reasonably
foreseeable that the defendant's con-
duct that caused injury or death to a
family member would also cause
mental distress to another fumJ/ry
member who witnessed the accident.
A family membet bystander claim has
three required elements of ptoof:
(1) the emotional impact came ftom
a sensory and contemporaneous per-
ception of the accident; Q) there
must be a close relationship between
the plaintiff and victim; and (3) the
victim must be killed or sustain seri-
ous physical injuty as a result of
defendant's negligence. ln Magaire u.
State (1992), the coutt made it plain
that a family member who was not
at the scene could not tecover undet
the Versland standatd.l6 ì7e should
also note that Wrsland did not
tequire physical manifestation of
the. emotional trauma
C. Recognizing emotional distress for
substantjal invasion of protected
interest absent physical or mental
injury
A line of cases that did not in-
volve family member claims could,
nevertheless, apply to family mem-
bers, In Johnson u. Søþersaue (1984),17
and Niles u. Big Sþ Elewear (1989),18
both cases of false imprisonment in
jail, the court allowed compensation
in situations that did not involve
physical or mental injury. The coutt
in Johnnn determined that thete is a
difference between injury and distress
and held that emotional disuess
could be compensated if the tortious
conduct resulted in a substantial
invasion of a legally protected inter-
est and caused a significant impact
upon the person of the plaintiff.
In First Bank, (\A.fBillings u.
Clark (1989),1e the court adopted
comment þ) of the Restatement
(Second) of Totts S 46 (1965) which
requires that, "The law intervenes
only where the distress inflicted is so
severe that no reasonable pefson
could be expected to endure it." The
court found Clark's testimony in his
bank bad faith case that the he "felt
bad, lost sleep and became v¡ith-
drawn" as inadequate to support such
a claim. Pertinent to family member
damages, is the fact that the court
found the necessary legally protected
interest to be "the interest in freedom
from emotional disttess."
This taises the question, could a
family member have a Johnson u.
Søþersaue claim without physical or
mental injuty? Consider this actual
fact scenatio: Missoula police and
sheriff's deputies responding to a
nighttime complaint of attempted
purse snatching at a mall mistakenly
stopped a new vehicle driven by a
federal probation officer and occu-
pied by his wife as well as adolescent
daughter and son. The deputies, with
gr:ns drawn and aimed at the heads
of the probation offi.cer and his son,
forced them to lie face down in the
gravel, their hands handcuffed behind
them, and guns still ttained at theit
heads. The probation officer's en-
treaties to take the loaded guns av/ay
from their heads and not to handcuff
the son behind his back because of a
recent shoulder surgery were met
with obscenity laced otders to "Shut
the uo!" The hvsterical wife
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and daughter were removed from the
vehicle and placed in the back seat of
a patrol car, Question;lJnder Johnson,
would the wife and daughter have
emotional distress claims for observ-
ing the treatment of the husband and
son even though they could not prove
physical or mental injury?
D. Expanding loss of consortium
claims
Â husband's right to loss of
consottium damages was recognized
at British common lau¿ Federal courts
were ftst to acknowledge a Montana
wife's right to consortium damages in
DnÍf, ,.Lþsman (1,961),20 Dafton u.
Hþhtower (1963),21 and Hall u. Uruited
States (1,967).22 The Montana Supreme
Court followed suit in Bain u. Gleason,
(1986).23 The court in Pence u. Fox,
(1991)24 confìtmed rhat "Montana
allows loss of consortium claims,
pursuant to Montana's \)lrongful
Death Statutes, l>y a parent whose
chjld has been kìlled, and by a chjld
whose parerrt has been kjlled."25 In
Pence, ti;'e coutt held that minot chï-
dren have a separate cause of action
fot loss of consottium when a parent
is tendered quadriplegic. The court
concluded, "that undet the Montana
case law and statutes as developed,
minot children are entitled to the
support, aid, protection, affection,
society, discþline, guidance and ttain-
ing of theìr patent." The court
quoted with approval the Colorado
Federal District Coutt's term "loss of
society and companionship" as being
equaþ appropriate to "loss of con-
sortium" which historically connoted
rights deriving from a sexual relation-
ship in marciage.In lQele u. St Vincent
Hospital dy Health Care, (1993),26 the
court expanded the minor chjld's
right to loss of parcntal consortium
beyond quadrþlegia to include any
claim in which:
(1) a third party tortiously
causes the parent to suffer a
serious, permanent and dis-
abling mental or physical in-
jury compensable under
Montana law;
(2) the parent's ultimate condi-
tion of mental or physical
impairment must be so over-
whelming and severe that
it causes the parent-chïd
telationship to be destroyed
ot nearþ desttoyed.
Finally, in Bear Medicine u. United
Stater Q002),27 the Montana Federal
District Coutt, on cettified question,
allowed parents recovery for loss of
consortium of an adult chïd. The
court reasoned that the Montana
Supreme Court's record of develop-
ment of consortium claims would
justify such a holding.
Under present tort law, damage
suffered lry a family member is recog-
tized as the basis for an independent
cause of action that is nevertheless
"parasitic" to the claim of the person
suffedng the direct njrry. Hence,
Bain u. Gleason (1986)'z8 established
that a spousek loss of consortium
claim is a distinct and independent
cause of action under tort law, which
is nevertheless, derivative of the
bodily injury claim of the person
suffering the direct physical injury.
Bain has been the precedent in Mon-
tana for classifiiing claims involving
Tangaage such as consortium, gtief,
sorrow of loss of care, comfort ot
society as patasitic to the claim of the
family member who suffered the
direct physical injuty and therefore
"detivative" for insutance purposes.
This has truly become the Bain of
consumef counsel's existence.29
Note that Montana law confuses
the relationship berwccn damages for
wrongful death claims, i.e., sorrow,
mental anguish, and grief, on the one
hand, and consottium damages, such
as loss of care, comfort, society, and
companionship on the other. ìØhile
the court has on occasion conflated
these as it did in cittng Dawson u. Hill
ù Hill Trucking fot recogntzing par-
ents'right to consortium damages for
death of a minor chìld, it also treats
the claims as separate and distinct
from each other in othet cases. For
example, 'tn Herru (2005), the court
reversed the mother's $300,000 con-
sottium verdict fot the death of her
daughter and yet upheld the $450,000
vefdict for "grief, sorfo\¡/, and mental
anguish." The Montana Federal Dis-
trict Coutt, looking at Montana law
said in Bear Medicine Q002):
These fwrongful death] dam-
ages for sorrow, mental dis-
tress or grief arc an element
of damages separate from loss
of consottium. 1/. Loss of
consoftium damages compen-
sate the plaintiff for the loss
of care, comfort, society and
companionship of the dece-
dent. Keele u. St Vincent Hospital
ú Heøltlt Care, 258 Mont.158,
161, 852 P.2d 574,576 (1,993).
Damages for grief and sorrow
compensate the plaintiff for
the mental anguish and anxiety
which occurs as a result of the
decedent's death. Dawson, 206
Mont. At 331, 671. P.2d at 593.
The difference between wtongful
death damages fot grief and sortow
as opposed to loss of consortium
damages for loss of society, comfort,
and companionship may still be open
to argument. Nevertheless, we carì
see that the range of loss of consor-
tium claims has been expanded
grearJy in Montana in the last thirty
years. Given changes in our society, it
is inevitable that the court will one
day address consortium damages for
members of same-sex unions.
E. Recognizing Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress (}JIED)
claims
The coutt exptessly recognized
the independent tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress in
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Sacco u. High Coøntry Independent Prus,
Inc. (1.995),30 a malicious prosecution
case. Prior to Sacco, emotional distress
was only a parasiric damage arising
from a host cause of action. \n Sacco,
the court held that, "a cause of
action for negligent infliction of
emotional disttess will adse under
circumstances where serious or
severe emotional disttess to the
plaintiff was the reasonably foresee-
able consequence of the defendant's
negligent act or omission." The coutt
also recognizeå a separate action fot
intentional infliction of emotional
distress "where serious or severe
emotional distress to the plaintiff
was the reasonably foreseeable corìse-
quence of the defendant's intentional
act or omission." The court Previ-
ously had allowed emotional distress
damages only in cases of "outla-
geous conduct,"ìl The court, in rec-
ogntzngthe twin torts for negligent
and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress effectively abandoned
Ve rs lan d J bys tander requirement,
Johnsonl requirement of a substantial
invasion of a legally protected inter-
est and Maqøirel requirement of
"outfageous conduct."
Treichel u. \'tate Farm Møt. Aøto.
Ins. Co. (1.997)32 involved a cause of
action for emotional distress to a
family member sufficiently indepen-
dent to trigger the "per accident"
limit of auto insutance covetage.
Treichel was riding bikes with her
husband and saw a car infltct a severe
head injury to him from which he
died. The court reiected the argument
that the claim was merely a derivative
cleio'mt ala Bain on the ground that
Treichel herself was actually at the
accident scene. It appearcd that the
court had reinstituted the bystander
requirement for recovering for
emotional distress.
However, in 2003, the court in
IYages u. Fir¡t National Irts' Co. of
Anerica,33 recognized the emotional
distress claim of a fathet who was
not present when his son was griev-
ously injured by being tun over bY a
truck whle roller-blading. ì7ages
fìled his own claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The
defense took the position that he
could not sustain an indePendent
non-derivative claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress with-
out having witnessed the accident so
as to suffet some contemporaneous
impact. The coutt held that a person
need not be at the scene of the acci-
dent so as to be a foreseeable plain-
tiff to whom the defendant would
owe a duty that v¡ould support a
claim fot negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
The court said that, when it
mentioned in -[reichel that she had
witnessed her husband getting kìlled,
it intended to support the distinction
between NIED claims and loss of
consortium claims such as Bain and
did not mean to suggest that the
bystander requirement existed again'
To determine foreseeabiJity in
NIED cases, the court said one
would consider, "closeness of the
relationship betv¡een plaintiff and
victim, the age of the vicLim, and the
severity of the injury of the victim
and any other factors bearing on the
question." NØhether the person was
a bystander could be considered
also, but, by itself, could not be
used to conclude that the plaintiff
was unforeseeable.
The court, in Sacco (1995), had
previously held that an independent
cause of action for negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional
distress arises under circumstances
where: (1) serious or severe emotional
distress to the plaintiff was (2) the
reasonably fotesçeable consequence
of (3) the defendant's negligent or
intentional act ot omission. Treichel
(1,997) did not teinstate the contem-
poraneous impact requirement of
Versland (1983). nØe should note that,
in IYagu, the coutt said that witness-
ing the accident was not necessary to
foreseeability. Consequently, the fam-
ily member who suffers severe emo-
tional distress as a result of another
family member's negligent bodily
injury may sta;te 
^î independent claimfor NIED, which trþgers 
^ 
seqarate
limit of insutance.
Ägain, 'n Henricksen u. State
Q00+)34 the court confrmed that one
is not required to be a bystander to
recovet damages for emotional dis-
tress suffered as a result of serious
injuty to a famtly member.
Henricksen brought her own
claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress after her three-year-old
suffered skull ftactures falling head
frst through staircase balustrades in
the Montana State University Library'
Henricksen learned immediateþ after
the accident that another child had
fallen through the same staircâse a
couple weeks eatlier, a fact that she
atgued caused her emotional distress.
The court rejected any requirement
fot direct emotional imPact uPon
the plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous PercePtion of
the accident, citing Sacco andlWages
for the rule that one need not be a
bystander,
The court also conftmed that
Henricksen had to meet the height-
'þresentatiue gouernnent and trial b1jary are tbe heart and langt oJ liberfl.
lYithout then we haue no otherfortification against beingridden like horses,
Jteuerl. tike sheeþ, worked like cattle, andfed and clothed like:wine and hound¡'"
- John Adans
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ened standard of severe or serious
distress required by Sacco. The trial
coutt had ruled that the family mem-
ber need only meet that standard if
there was no physical or mental in-
jury. Hendcksen introduced expert
testimony of PTSD. The Montana
Supreme Court held that emotional
disttess must always be severe or
serious regardless of physical or
mental manifestation. The court cited
Restatement (Second) of Torts, $ 46,
comment k for the proposition that
"[n]otmally, severe emotional distress
is accompanied or followed by shock,
illness, or other bodily harm, wltìdn in
itself affords evidence that the distress
is genuine and severe." The coutt
said, ",4. jury instructiorì or1 emotional
distress should state that the severe
and serious standard applies and that
this standard can be met by proof
that emotional clistress resulted in
shock, illness, or other bodily hatm."
F. Limiting the "serious or severe"
standard to independent claims
SaccoI standard that the emotional
distress must be serious or sevefe to
be cognizable in court only applies to
the independent tort claims of negli-
gent or intentional infliction of emo-'
tional distress. The court'tn Jacobsen u.
Allstate Iru¡. Co. Q009),3s overturned a
district court ruling that the plaintiff
in an insutance bad faith case was not
entitled to an instruction for emo-
tional distress damages unless he
made a thteshold showing that they
were serious or seYere as required
by the court in First Bank 
€lA.) ,
Billings u. Clark in 1989.
The court after conceding that it
had cteated confusion as to which
standard applied in its decisions in
Seltyer u, Mortoru Q007)36 and l-.arøng u.
þrtis Ins. Co. Q008)3'1held that the
"sefious or severe" standard of Sacco
applies only to the stand-alone inde-
pendent toÍt causes of action and not
emotional distress damages parasitic
to an underþing tort. For those
claims, the court adopted the stan-
dard set out in Montana Pattetn In-
structions GvI /P.L2d 25.02, 15.01 -03)
which states that "[t]he law does not
set a definitç standard by which to
calculate compensation for mental
end emotional suffering and distress."
In that decision, the court also noted
that emotional disuess damages ate
available in the context of thfud-party
UTPÁ. claims contrary to the appar-
ent assertions of Allstate.3s
G. Summary of ,$ailable Family
Member Tort Claims
We summarize by say'ng that,
among the tort claims recognized by
the Montana Supreme Court for
addressing secondary injury to fuoily
members are the following:
1. Family members may re-
cover for damages for sorrow,
mental distress or grief over
the death of a farniy member
under the wrongful death stat-
ute, MCA 27-1.-51.2 (1979).
Dawson (1983).
2. Farrily members may press
a stand-alone tort claim for
negligent infLiction of emo-
tional distress where serious or
sevefe emotional distress to
the plaintiff was the reason-
ably foreseeable consequence
of the defendant's negligent
act or omission, i.e., any claim
where the tortfeasor negli-
gently causes serious of severe
injury to the victim and result-
ing emotional injury to the
famtly member was foresee-
abIe. Sacco (1995).
3. Family members may press ,
a stand-alone tott claim fot
intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress where the
tortfeasor acted with substan-
rù certunty of risk of injury
of death, serious or severe
injury or death occurs, and
resulting emotional injuty to
the family member was fore-
seeable. S acco (1.995).
4. A family member may
fecover emotional disttess
damages suffered as a result
of another member's injury
or death which damages are
patasitic to an underþing tort
claim arising out of that injury
ot death. Janbwn (2009); and
Puchel Q009).
5. ,4. family member may
fecovef emotional disttess
damages suffered absent any
mental or physical injury if
the tortious conduct resulted
in a substantial invasion of a
legally protected interest and
causes a signifìcant impact
upon the person of the plain-
tiff, i.e., watching the police
mistakenly take one's spouse
out of the house at night
handcuffed and at gunpoint.
Joltnson (1,98\; and Ni/e¡ (1989).
6. A husband ot wife may
press a claim for loss of
spouse's consortium.
7. Aparcnt or minor child may
press a claim for loss of com-
fort, society and companion-
ship of the other. Penæ (1.991);
and Keele (1993).
8. Ä parent may press a clnm
for loss of comfort, society
and companionship of an
adult child. Bear Medicine
Q002); and Hern (2005).
II. INSURANCE COVERAGE
OF FAMILY MEMBER TORT
CI.AIMS UNDER MONTANA
I.AW
A. The basic policy language
The Insutance Services Office,
aade organtzatton for the property/
casualty insurance industry, drafts the
standard policy langaage for awto
policies commonly used in Montana.
The basic insudng agreement for the
Personal Auto Policy Liabiìity PART
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A-LIABILITY COVER,\GE
INSURING ,\GREEMENT
provides in pertinent Part:
\Øe will pay damages for
"bodily injury" or "proPerty
damage" for which any "in-
sured" becomes legally respon-
sible because of an auto
accident.3e * * *
The policy defìnes" Bodily In-
jury" for all coverages as follows:a0
"Bodily Injuty'' means bodily
harm, sickness ot disease,
including death that results.
The "Limit of LiabiTty" clause
for the lìability coverage provides:
The limit of liabilty shown in
the Declarations for each Pet-
son for Bodily Injury Liability
is our maximum limit of liabil-
ity for all damages, including
damages for care,loss of ser-
vices or death, arising out of
"bodily itjtty'' sustained by
any one person in any one auto
accident. Subject to this limit
for each person, the limit of
liability shown in the Declara-
tions for each accident for
Bodily Injury Liabiìity is our
maximum limit of liability for
all damages for "bodily injurY"
resulting ftom any one auto
accident,
The P,\RT B-MEDiC,A'L P,\Y-
MENTS COVERÂGE INSURING
AGREEMENT provides:al
A. We will pay reasonable ex-
penses incurred for necessary
medical and funeral services
because of "bodily iniuty'':
1. Caused by accident; and
2. Sustained by an insuted.
ThC PART C-UNINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE INSUR_
ING A.GREEMENT ptovides:
\X/e will pay compensatory
damages which an "insuted" is
legatly entitled to recover from
the ownet or operatot of an
"unilsured motof vehicle
because of "bodily injury":
1. Sustained by an "ilsured," and
2. Caused by accident.
The "Lirnit of Liability'' clause
is essentiaþ identical to that fot the
liability coverage.
B. Emotional distress covered as
"bodily infury''
Treichel u. State Førzn Mat. Aato.
Ins. Co. (1,997)42 held that negligent
infliction of emotional disttess to a
family member triggers an additional
Iimit, the "pet accident" Limit, of
auto insurance coverage. Treichel was
riding bikes with her husband and
saw a çar infLict a severe head injury
to her husband from which he died'
The court distinguished Treichei's
claim ftom Bainbecause Treichel was
at the accident so that she had a claim
that was not parasitic or derivative.
As mentioned above, Treichel sounded
like tesutrection of Verslørtd's by'
stander requitement, until the court
in IVages in 2004 said one could re-
cover for NIED rvithout ever having
been to the scene of the accident.
The plaintiffs' bar was heartened by
the decisions in Treichel and lØagu.
C. Emotional disttess not covered
as "bodily itjoty''
Howeveï, coming shortly after
IVagu, the decision of Jacobsen u' Førm-
ers Union Mwtaal Insøranæ Conþan1 tn
20044i was a blunt reminder that to(t
and insurance law do not necessarily
converge. Jacobsen held that emotional
distress was not covered as "bodily
injury'' under the auto policy. Jacobsen
found an auto crashed in a wheat
fìeld and treated the ddver's head
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injuries only to learn, when the driver
was temoved from the car, that he
hacl actuaþ shot himself in the head
in a suicide âttempt from which he
later died.
Jacobsen claimed damages for his
emotional distress from his own auto
insuret, Farmets Union Mutual, un-
det its UM and Med Pay coverages.
Farmers Union Mutual refused any
benefits for Jacobsen's resulting emo-
tional distress on the grounds that
they did not constirute "bodily in-
jury''within the meaning of the UM
stâtute S 33-23-201, or the UM policy
agreement. Farmets Union Mutual's
UM basic insuting agreement con-
tained standatd language:
NØe will pay ail. sums the "in-
sured" is legally entitled to
recovef as compensatoty dam-
ages from the owner or drivet
of an "uninsured motor ve-
hicle." The damages must re-
sult from "bodily injury"
sustained by the "insured"
caused by an "accident." The
owner's or driver's liability for
these damages must result
from the ownership, mainte-
nance of use of the "unin-
sured motor vehicle."
The policy's defìnition of "bodily
tnfixyl'which is consistent v¡ith the
statuteb, was as follows:
"Bodily injury'' means bodily
injury, sickness or disease sus-
tained by a person including
death resulting from ant¡ of
these.
The Montana Supreme Court
held, "[!]he term 'bodily injury,' as
defìned in Farmers Union UM poJicy,
is limited to physical injury to a per-
son caused by an accident and does
not include emotional and psycho-
logical injuries stemming therefrom."
The court distinguished Treichel by
asserting that State Farm's poJicy in
Treicltel did not define bodily injury
and that the policy clearþ coveted
such cla-ims as loss of consortium.
Further, State Farm was wìlling to
cover emotional injuries but only up
to the "one person" lirnitation in the
policy, The Treichel court had held
that State Farm was simply estopped
to deny covetage and found that
Carolyn Treichel had suffered an
"independent and direct" injury as
was deemed compensable in Sacco.
For the court'n Jacobsen (2004),
the fact that a person has suffeted an
emotional "injury'' for purposes of
tort law does not mean the emotional
injury is "bodily injuty" under jnsur-
ance contract law The court quoted
with approval Farmets Unionb asser-
tion that "[t]here is no dispute that
Montana tort law allows for recovery
of pureþ emotional damages. How-
ever, this case involves the intetpreta-
tion of contract, and tort law is
wholly irrelevant to that interpreta-
ion." Jacobsen (2004) seemed to close
the door on insurance coverage fot
emotional distress.
D. Diffetentiating covetage based
on policy language
Grim as Jacobsen's result was, it
could be avoided in cases of slightly
different policy language. In Allstan
Insarance Conþøryt u, Wagner-E//worth,4
a school child, Mathew Rusk, was
severely injured when an Âllstate
insured ran over him while he and his
brother Btandon were in a school
crosswalk. The mother, Tiffany Rusk,
arcweå moments later to find het son
þing injured and then accompanied
him to the hospital in the ambulance.
Allstate paid out the $50,000 policy
limits on the Bodily Injury coverage,
but the mother and brother brought
their own claims for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress allegrng
physical and mental injuries. Both
underwent therapy. Allstate refused to
defend or indemnifii for those claims
on the basis of r}re Jacobrcn Q004)
decision and filed a declatatory action
in which it was granted summary
judgment that it owed neither defense
nor indemnity. Rusks appealed.
The basic BI covetage agreement
provided in pertinent part that,
"Allstate will pay damages which an
insured person is legally obligated to
pay because of: a. bodily injuty sus-
tained by any person. . ." It defìned
"bodily injury'' to meân "physical
harm to the body, sickness, disease,
or death, but does not include:
a. Any venereal disease; b. Herpes;
c. Âcquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome (,A.IDS); d.,\IDS Related
Complex (ARC); e. Human lmmuno-
defìciency Virus (HIV); or aÍry result-
ing symptom, effect, condition, disease
or illness related to a. through e.
listed above." ,\lsq the policy Limita-
tion of Liability section provided
that, "[t]he limit stated for each per-
son for bodily injury is our total limit
of liability for dl damages because
of bodily injury sustained by one
person, incløding all darnages tøstained b1
anlone else as a result of that bodily
injury," (Coutt's emphasis added.)
The issue taised was whether the
emotional distress claims of Tiffany
and Brandon could be covered under
the policy's BI coverage language.
The court held that the policy would
cover damages fot emotional distress
of"Íiffany and Brandon because of
bodily injury sustained by Mathew
The court reasoned that the policy's
broad promise to pay "damages
which an insured person is legaþ
tesponsible to pay because of bodily
injury sustained by any petson. . ."
means emotional damages of Tiffany
and Btandon because of Mathew's
bodily injury are covered. This is a
broader promise to p^y than was
contained tn the Jacobsen (2004) policy.
However, the court then ruled
that the damages fot emotional
distress of Tiffany and Brandon
because of bodily injury to Mathew
are derivative unåer Bain u. Cleason
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(1986) and do not trigger separate
Limits of JiabiJity. Under S 61-ó-103,
MCA (1981) and the Allstate policy's
Limitation of Liability clause, such
claims do not trigger additional lim-
its, and the only insurance available
was the single $50,000 limit which
was already paid out.
E. Covered "bodily injury''whete
there are physical manifestations
of emotional distress
Nevertheless, this still left the
issue whether the poJicy Iangaage
covers claims of Tiffany and Bran-
don for mental injuries accompanied
by physical manifestations. The court
held that, to the extent they are based
on physical manifestations, Tiffany
and Brandon's claims, fa-ll within the
"bodily injtxf'definition of the
Allstate poJicy. The court overruled
Jacobsen Q004) in its holding to the
conffary. The court reasoned that, in
Jacobsen, it had held that "the term
'bodily injury' as defìned in Farmers
Union UM policy, is limited to physi-
calinjury to a person caused by an
accident and does not include emo-
tional and psychological injuries
stemming therefrom." However, the
court in this instance said it had erro-
neously relied on cases alleging only
emotional distress and had ovedooked
a substantial body of cases holding
that emotional distress accompanied
by physical manifestations constituted
bodily 
-jo.y. The Allstate policy was
found to be ambiguous in its defini-
tion of bodily injury insofar as the
term could include strictly physical
injury or could include physical mani-
festations arising from mental or
psychological injury. Accordingly, the
court reveÍsed the summary judgment
and remanded the case.
Recovety where the emotional
disttess has physical manifestations
was confrmed tn Tacker u. Farners Ins.
Exchange Q009)!5 There, eleven-year-
old Cady Tucker of Idaho was killed
on Montana Highway 83 at Seeley
Lake while riding in a vehicle owned
and operated by Cushman, a Mon-
tanan. Montana resident, Janie
McNair negJigently crossed the
centedine causing the collision.
Cady Tucket died after living an
appreciable length of time.
State Farm paid Bodily Injury
limits on behalf of McNair as survi-
vorship damages. However, the case
went to rial on issues involving the
$1 million UIM umbrella coverage
Cady Tucker's stepfather, Robert
Starr, had with Farmers Insurance
Exchange 6IE). Ultimately, the case
\Mas tried against FIE in Montana's
Fourth Judicial District where a jury
awarded $516,000.
One of the issues on appeal was
whether the mother's emotional dis-
tress and grief in the wrongful death
acrion constituted "bodily injury'' so
as to be covered under the UIM
policy coverage. The Montana Su-
preme Court held that Cady's mother
suffered from menta-l injudes that
were accompanied by physical mani-
festations, which constituted covered
"bodily injury," The court noted that
FIE relied :upon Jøcobson u. Farmers
Union (2004)a6 which limited "bodily
injuty'' to physical injury to a person
caused by an accident. But, IYagner-
Ellsworth (2008) subsequently con-
strued "bodily injury" to include
mental or psychological tnjary that is
accompanied by physical manifesta-
tions. The court then discussed in
detail such things as PTSQ sweating,
increased heàtt rate, increased respi-
ration, psychosis of seeing and hear-
ing her daughter as physical manifes-
tations of emotional distress. This
decision illustrates the technique and
evidence necessary to prove physical
manifestation of emotìonal distress.
F. Barring recovery wktsLe the Jacobsen
(2004) window was closed
The federal case of King u. Snn
Farm Fire and Casøal4t Co. Q01,0)q
involved a $600,088.47 verdict I(ings
won against the manufacturer of a
log home package. After consttuc-
tion, I(ings discovered numerous
deficiencies in the log package, which
deficiencies breached the contract
specifìcations and included "short
and random length logs, an unaccept-
able mix of ft, spruce and lodge pole
pine logs, alack of 'de logs' to stabi-
lize the home, logs with a rougher
fìnish than desited which required
additional planing and sanding, unde-
sirable gaps at the corners that re-
quired sealing, and logs that wete not
pre-cut." I(ings sued the log home
manufacturer on multiple counts
including a clatm for emotional dis-
tress. State Farm refused to defend
any of the claims.
I(ings sued State Farm to enforce
the judgment, and State Farm won
summary judgment on all counts.
The Montana Supreme Court upheld
the summaty judgments, The issue
befote the court pertinent to this
discussion was whether the undedy-
ing complaint alleging emotional
distress as a result of the defendant
log home manwfacttter's perfidy
constituted "Bodily Injury'' that
would be covered under the CGL
policy. The court held it would not
reasoning that, at the time the com-
plaint was filed, emotional injuries or
physical manifestations of emotional
ihjuries were not considered "bodily
injury'' under Jacobsen u. Farners Mø-
tøal lrus. Co. Q004). Allstate Insørance
Co. u. IWagner-E,llsworth (2008), which
allowed physical manifestations of
emotional disttess as "bodily njary"
under liability poJicies, was not the
law of the case, having not been
decided at that point.
In the.underþing case, I(ings
also alleged property damage in an
attempt to trigger the "Property
Damage Iiabthtt¡" coverage. How-
ever, the court held the underþing
complaint did not allege "property
damage" within the meaning of the
policy, because any loss of use of the
logs or the home wasn't caused by
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their destruction but by teceipt of
poor quality materials. The court
found there was no allegation that the
logs were injured or destroyed.
G. Can the heit's wrongÊrl death
action trigger the "each accident"
Iimit?
Given that, in the case of death,
the decedent's estate is the claimant
for the survival action, and the heirs
are ¡he claimants for different dam-
ages on the wrongful death action,
the question raised is whether the tv¡o
actions should trigger the "each acci-
dent" limit of casualty insurance
coverage?
The Montana Supreme Court has
not addtessed this issue. However,
Judge Cebull for the Montana Federal
Cout has tn State Farm Matual Auto.
Ins. u. Bowen,48 in 2005. The issue
there was whether the "Each Person"
limit applies when there are survival
and wrongful death claims arising
out of the injury and death of a
single insured. Judge Cebull held
that the wrongful death and survival
claims are subject to the "Each Pet-
son" limit under the UIM coverage
reasoning that the wrongfirl death
and survival action is more like the
consortium claim in Bain QvIont.
1986) than the emotional distress
claim in Treichel (I\4ont. 1.997). He
teasoned that the totfeasor in the
consortium claim doesnlt owe an
independent or direct duty to the
family member of the victim, whle
the emotional distress claim is based
on a direct duty (foreseeabiJity of
injury) to the family bystandet. Judge
Cebull also submitted that 
"itt"ulty
every court that has considered the
issue has detetmined that the wrong-
frrl death and survival claims are
subject to the "F.ach Petson" limit.
ìØe should note that, though the issue
in Bowen was UIM limits, the same
argument will apply to BI limits. This
is an issue of ftst impression in
Montana, and the Montana Supreme
Court is not bound by the fedetal
courth determination.
H. Trþgering the "each accident"
limit for wrongfirl death with the
right poJicy language
The precise wording of the
"Limit of Liability" clause in the auto
policy can make the diffetence in
whether one can trþger the "per
accident" limit. In the recent case of
State Farm Mat Aato. Ins. Co. u. Freler
(201,0),4e the court triggered a second
limit of coverage for a wrongful
death claim btought by the infant
daughter of the decedent fot whose
death the carrier had akeady patd a
single limit on the survival action.
In Freler, State Farm insured an
auto driven by Vail Freyer in which
her husband, Heath Freyer, and in-
fant daughter, ÄJicia, were passen-
gers. An auto driven by Manning
collided with the Freyer vehicle on
L9ù Avenue outside Bozeman, tesult-
ing in Heath's death and injury to the
infant Alicia, who incurred $2,500 in
medical expenses. Manning's insurer
paid the Bodily Injuty coverage Limits
for Heath's death presumably to
Heath's estate on the survival action.
State Farm also paid a single "Bach
Person" limit of $50,000 for Heath's
death under its BI coverage and paid
Alicia's medical expense. State Farm
refused the demand that it pay a sec-
ond Jimit, the "Each Accident" limit
of coverage to the infant Alicia for
her claim for wrongfrrl death.
The district corlrt granted sum-
mary judgment to State Farm fìnding
that the "poJicy definition of 'bodily
injury to one person"'was not am-
bþous. Any claim asserted by Alicia
related to the wrongful death or
survivorship of her father and was
therefore included in the "Each Per-
son" limit. However, the "Limits of
Liability" clause for the Bodily lnjury
coverage provided as follows:
The amount of bodily injuty
liability coverage is shown on
the declatations page undet
"Limits of Liability-Covetage
A-Bodily Injury, Each Petson
Each 
'\ccident." IJnder "Each
Pefson" is the amount of cov-
erage for all damages due to
bodily injury to one person.
"Bodily injury to orìe person"
includes all injury and damages
to othet persons, including
emotional distress, sustained
by such other persons who do
not sustairì bodily injury. Under
"Each Accident" is the total
amount of coverage, subject to
the amount shown under
"Each Person", for all dam-
ages due to bodily injuty to
two or more persons in the
same accident. fEmphasis in
otiginal removed.]so
The policy defined "bodily in-
jury'' as "physical bodily injury to a
person and sickness, disease or death
which results ftom it. A person does
not sustain bodily infury if they suf-
fer emotional distress in the absence
of physical bodily injury." The decla-
rations page shows the "each Person"
limit of $50,000 and the Each,A.cci-
dent limit as $100,000.
The Supreme Court saw the issue
ìn Freyr as arising from, "our juris-
prudence concerning'derivative dam-
ages' and the specific language of the
State Farm policy." Said the courtr
"Derivative damages ate åam-
ages that 'derive' from another
petson's injury or wrongfi-rl
death. They are q4lically
sought by the spouse or chil-
dren of the injured or de-
ceased person, and include,
among other things, loss of
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consortium, loss of suppoft,
grief, sorrow, and mental an-
g;jsh Mikelson u. Montana Rail
Linþ 1nc.2000 MT 11,1,299
Mont. 348, 999 P.2d985. Farn-
ers Unìon Mut. In¡. Co. V. Staples,
2004 NIT 108, 321 Mont. 99, 90
P.3d 381." Freyer at fl8.
Under Allstate u. IYagner-Ellsworth
(2008),r the court had established
that, "under the poJicy provision
there at issue, the claims of family
members for derivative losses sus-
tained as a result of another farntly
member's bodily injury must be re-
covered under the 'each person' limit
of the insured who sustained bodily
injury. But, the State Farm policy here
provided that, "Bodily injury to one
person includes all injury and dam-
ages to other persons, including emo-
tional distress sustained by other
persons who do not sastain bodiþ injury."
(Emphasis added.) The personal
representative representing Alicia
atgued that the third sentence of the
limit of liability clause thar confined
derivative claims to the "Each Per-
son" limit did not apply to Alicia
because she was not among the per-
sons "who do not sustain bodily
itjrty," The court agreed saying that
to construe the clause to apply to all
persons with detivative claims would
require it to þore the "who do not
sustain bodily injury'' langaage.
On the other hand, the court
said, if Srate Farm's interpretation
was teasonable, then the Limit of
LiabiJity provision was ambþous
and had to be construed in Alicia's
favor. The court warned in closing
that their decision was driven by the
parttcular language of the State Farm
policy before them and that, "It is
not ouî intention here to alter our
'detivative claims' jurisprudence as
most recently set forth in lWagner-
Ellsworth."
Conclusion
Montana tort law has grown to
provide signifìcant remedies for fam-
ily membets who suffer secondary
injuties or damages by teason of
direct severe injury of death of a
loved one. Howevef, insurance and
the law governing insurance dictate
how much the rights of tort victims
and their family members who suffer
damages will be vindicated. Langtage
of the basic insuring agreements,
such as poJicy definitions of "bodily
inftry," and "Limits of Liabiìity''
clauses arc ctittcd. to court decisions
on coverage of family member inju-
ries and damages. It is imperative that
counsel study these clauses intricately
and know the permutations of the
tort cases governing loss of corlsor-
tium and emotional distress in tan-
dem with the insurance cases.
Dealing with the claims of the
famjly members of persons severely
injured or killed tequires a tda-l
lawyer's best analytical skills and
creativity.
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